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Aural Sex: Has Congress Gone Too Far
by Going All the Way With
Dial-a-Porn?
by HEIDI SKUBA MARETZ*
Introduction
Telephone companies and independent providers of sexually
explicit telephone messages earn huge profits every year in
the Dial-a-Porn' industry.2 Meanwhile, the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC), the legislature and the courts
have searched for the most effective, least restrictive way to
regulate Dial-a-Porn without unconstitutionally infringing on
the right to free speech guaranteed by the first amendment.3
In 1983, Congress added section 223(b) to the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 to restrict telephone transmission of obscene
or indecent pre-recorded messages to minors.4 In April and
again in November of 1988, the federal legislature amended
section 223(b), resulting in a statute that completely prohibits
all obscene or indecent Dial-a-Porn messages [hereinafter 1988
* B.A., UCLA, 1985; Member, Third Year Class.
1. "Dial-a-Porn" is the colloquial name given to information services that pro-
vide sexually explicit messages over the phone to callers for a fee. They are accessi-
ble either locally through a "976" network or nationwide through a Mass
Announcement Network Service (MANS). See infra note 24 and accompanying
text. Until 1980, AT&T offered a number of types of recorded messages, including
prayers, jokes, time, and weather, as part of its "enhanced services." When the FCC
ordered AT&T to divest these services in 1980, independent service providers began
to offer a variety of recorded messages competitively, including Dial-a-Porn. See
Second Computer Inquiry, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 50, paras.
2, 12 (1980), qff'd, Computer & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198,
205 & n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983).
2. The California Dial-a-Porn industry generates approximately 45 million dol-
lars a year, of which Pacific Bell, a California phone company, earns thirty percent.
PUC Says PacBell Can Disconnect Dial-A-Por San Francisco Chron., Mar. 24, 1988,
at A18, col. 4. Because California has the largest market for Dial-a-Porn, this Note
focuses on California and federal law. See also "Dial-A-Porn" Services, Third Report
and Order in Docket No. 83-989, FCC 87-143, 52 Fed. Reg. 17,760, 62 RAD. REG. 2d (P
& F) 1431 (adopted April 16, 1987) [hereinafter Third Report and Order].
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1983). See infra note 34 for text of this statute.
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statute].5 Although this extreme measure may please oppo-
nents of Dial-a-Porn, its constitutionality is in serious ques-
tion. In July 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court is expected to rule
on the constitutionality of this statute for the first time and,
hopefully, resolve some of the confusion that currently exists
in the Dial-a-Porn industry.6
Message providers, telephone companies, telephone custom-
ers (both the willing recipients of messages and those who
contact Dial-a-Porn by dialing a wrong number), and the state
all have interests which must be considered and balanced in
an examination of any Dial-a-Porn regulation. This Note ex-
amines the tensions in balancing these interests in the context
of the short history of attempts to regulate this thriving indus-
try. It scrutinizes the 1988 statute as well as the former less
restrictive statute and its correlative FCC regulations.
This Note analyzes recent decisions in the Second and Ninth
Circuits that attempt to balance the competing interests, and
actions taken by phone companies and state public utilities
commissions to address the growing consumer concern over
the Dial-a-Porn industry. It proposes how the Supreme Court
should rule on these issues in July 1989 and concludes that the
1988 statute is unconstitutional and should be invalidated in
favor of a statute that narrowly regulates both obscene and
indecent Dial-a-Porn, in order to restrict access by minors.
I
Background: The Regulators' Dilemma
If all Dial-a-Porn messages could be defined as obscene,7 the
government could regulate or even prohibit them, because ob-
5. Augustus F. Hawkins-Robert T. Stafford Elementary and Secondary School
Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-297, § 6101, 102 Stat. 130, 424
(April 28, 1988) [hereinafter April amendment] (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)
(1988)); Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7524, 102 Stat. 4181, 4502 (Nov.
18, 1988) [hereinafter November amendment] (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)
(1988)). See ivfra note 19 for text of current statute.
6. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 692 F. Supp. 1208 (C.D. Cal.
1988), prob. juris noted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Jan. 9, 1989) (Nos. 88-515, 88-525)
(Both the FCC and Sable Communications petitioned the Supreme Court for certio-
rari.). The U.S. Supreme Court never reviewed the 1983 statute.
7. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), defines obscenity according to a
three-part test:
(1) Whether "the average person, applying contemporary community stan-




scene speech is not protected by the first amendment.8 Many
Dial-a-Porn messages are not obscene, however, but are
merely indecent.9 Indecent speech has never been excepted
from constitutional protection.' 0 Any content-based regulation
that restricts or interferes with protected forms of expression
must use the least restrictive means available and must assert
a compelling governmental interest that justifies the interfer-
ence.'" Therefore, until the Supreme Court rules that inde-
cent speech is not protected by the first amendment, such
speech may be regulated only narrowly and only when justi-
fied by a compelling governmental interest. 2
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the protec-
tion of minors as a compelling governmental interest.13 In
(2) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sex-
ual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(3) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, polit-
ical, or scientific value.
Id
8. Id; Paris Adult Theatres v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957).
9. There is no universally accepted definition of indecency for communications
media, but the Supreme Court stated in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978),
that the normal definition of "indecent" merely refers to "nonconformance with ac-
cepted standards of morality." Id at 740. The Pacifica court held that language
which "depicted sexual and excretory activities in a patently offensive manner" and
was "broadcast at a time when children were undoubtedly in the audience" was in-
decent. I& at 732.
10. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113, 121 & n.12 (2d Cir. 1984)
[hereinafter Carlin I].
11. Id at 121. See Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 74 (1981); Schaumburg
v. Citizens, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980). See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
The Court held Cohen could not be charged with a criminal offense for wearing a
jacket with the words "Fuck the Draft" on it. They held that the slogan was not
obscene, id at 20, and, therefore, Cohen could not be convicted unless the govern-
ment proved a "more particularized and compelling reason for its actions," as his
speech was protected by the first amendment. I& at 26. "Without a showing of in-
tent to incite disobedience to or disruption of the draft, Cohen could not, consistently
with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, be punished for asserting the evident
position on the inutility or immorality of the draft his jacket reflected." I& at 18.
12. In Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957), the Supreme Court stated that the
government cannot "reduce the adult population.., to reading only what is fit for
children, [for] this is to burn the house to roast the pig." Id at 383.
There is also a governmental interest in protecting unconsenting adults from ex-
pressions to which the receiver has no opportunity to give or withhold consent. Dial-
a-Porn regulations, however, are not aimed at protecting this unwilling listener, as
Dial-a-Porn is a service that requires the listener to place the call. See Carlin I, 749
F.2d at 120 & n.10.
13. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726 (1978) (holding that the government interest in the well-being of its youth
justified prohibition on indecent broadcasting received by both children and adults);
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Ginsberg v. New York, the Court recognized two specific inter-
ests that justify a limitation on the availability of sexually ex-
plicit material to minors: 1) the parents' right to the support of
laws designed to aid them in controlling and rearing their chil-
dren; and 2) the independent interest of the government in
the well-being of its youth.14 The chief concern about Dial-a-
Porn is that children may be harmed by exposure to sexually
explicit messages.15
The pre-amendment version of section 223(b) [hereinafter
1983 statute]16 was arguably justified by the governmental in-
terest in protecting children, in that it applied only to trans-
missions of obscene and indecent telephone messages to
persons under eighteen years of age. 17 Further, it gave Dial-a-
Porn service providers the chance to avoid prosecution under
the statute by restricting access to minors in compliance with
.FCC regulations promulgated under the statute.'
The 1988 statute, 9 however, not only removes all defenses
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (holding that stricter regulations may be
placed on materials available to minors, as long as they do not materially infringe
upon the rights of adults to obtain such materials).
14. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639-40.
15. "The interest in protecting minors from salacious matter is no doubt quite
compelling." Carlin I, 749 F.2d at 121. See also Pacifta, 438 U.S. at 749.
16. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1983). See infra note 34 for text of the 1983 statute.
17. Id
18. Id. See infra note 87 for the text of the most recent regulations.
19. The text of the 1988 statute reads:
(b)(1) Whoever knowingly-
(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communi-
cation, by means of telephone, makes (directly or by recording
device) any obscene communication for commercial purposes to
any person, regardless of whether the maker of such communi-
cation placed the call; or
(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to be
used for an activity prohibited by clause (i);
shall be fined in accordance with title 18 of the United States Code,
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly-
(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communi-
cation, by means of telephone, makes (directly or by recording
device) any indecent communication for commercial purposes to
any person, regardless of whether the maker of such communi-
cation placed the call; or
(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to be
used for an activity prohibited by clause (i),
shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than six
months, or both.
November amendment, supra note 5 (emphasis added).
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to prosecution under the statute, but it also removes all age
limitations. The statute thus prohibits all transmissions of ob-
scene or indecent phone communications to anyone at any
time.20
II
The Dial-a-Porn Message Service
Dial-a-Porn messages may be live or recorded.21 They gen-
erally last from thirty seconds to two minutes and can be
heard by up to 50,000 callers per hour, twenty-four hours a
day.22 The message on any service can be changed several
times a day.23Dial-a-Porn messages are accessed either through local
phone companies or. through a nationwide Mass Announce-
ment Network Service (MANS). 4 Messages on a local service
are reached either by local calls from the area serviced or in-
20. Id See April amendment, supra note 5, which specifically deleted from sec-
tion 223(b) any defense to prosecution and struck the words "under eighteen years
of age" from the statute.
21. Because live messages usually require prepayment by credit card and be-
cause it may be presumed that minors do not generally have access to credit cards,
live Dial-a-Porn is not seen as a problem by either the FCC or the courts. Enforce-
ment of Prohibitions Against the Use of Common Carriers for the Transmission of
Obscene Materials, Report and Order in Docket No. 83-989, FCC 84-253, 49 Fed. Reg.
24,996, 24,998, 56 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 49 (adopted June 19, 1984) [hereinafter First
Report and Order]. See also Note, Telephones, Sex, and the First Amendmen 33
UCLA L. REv. 1221, 1223-24 (1986).
22. A typical Dial-a-Porn message has a woman's recorded voice describing or
suggesting sexual acts to the listener. Examples of Dial-a-Porn messages available
on a Bay Area service include: a dramatization of an encounter between two women
and a male forest ranger on a camping trip, Dial-a-Porn message, choice number 3,
(415) 976-6900 (Mar. 22, 1989); and a woman who asks the caller to perform various
sexual acts with her. Id, choice number 1. See the Appendix for full transcript of
these messages. There are also messages directed at both male and female homosex-
ual audiences. See San Francisco Bay Guardian, Feb. 8, 1989, at 56-57.
23. Carlin 1, 749 F.2d at 114.
24. MANS are facilities maintained by telephone companies for the transmission
of announcement services, such as Dial-a-Porn. Enforcement of Prohibitions
Against the Use of Common Carriers for the Transmission of Obscene Materials,
Second Report and Order in Docket No. 83-989, FCC 85-554, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,699
(adopted Oct. 22, 1985) [hereinafter Second Report and Order], at para. 14. The ma-
jority of MANS numbers are accessed on a "976" exchange. Id. Messages on a
MANS can be accessed directly (local calls) or by dialing the appropriate area code
(long distance calls). First Report and Order, supra note 21, at para. 3. AT&T main-
tains a MANS known as "Dial-It 900," with central facilities in Missouri, which can
be accessed interstate from anywhere in the country by dialing the 900 area code
number assigned to the message provider. Third Report and Order, supra note 2, at
para. 8.
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terstate by long distance from anywhere in the country.25
These message services are subject to local tariffs.28
Message services on a nationwide MANS may provide inter-
state transmission of all types of information, including Dial-a-
Porn.27 These services are subject to FCC tariffs.'
III
The History of Attempts to Regulate
Dial-a-Porn
A. The Statute
The 1988 statute prohibits the interstate or foreign transmis-
sion by telephone (directly or by recording) of any obscene or
indecent communication for commercial purpose to any
person, regardless of who places the call. 9 Obscene and inde-
cent communications are only distinguished within the statute
by the imposition of a stricter penalty for obscene com-
munications. 0
Section 223 was originally enacted in 1982 to prohibit ob-
scene or harrassing telephone calls.3 ' In 1983, when the FCC
25. First Report and Order, supra note 21, at para 3. The telephone company
bills the customer for the call at a rate determined by the message provider. It then
collects the billings and deducts a flat rate and a usage charge before sending the
rest of the collected billings to the message provider. Carlin Communications v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1354 (11th Cir. 1986). See notes 167-74
and accompanying text for a discussion of Pacific Bell's new 900 area code network.
26. Third Report and Order, supra note 2, at paras. 7-8. A tariff is a public docu-
ment which the phone company must file with the state public service commission
setting forth the services being offered, the rates for services and the rules and regu-
lations relating to those services. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1306 (5th ed. 1979).
27. In addition to Dial-a-Porn, other types of messages may be transmitted over
this service, including time and temperature, information, weather, sports, horo-
scopes, soap opera updates, and jokes. See Note, Telephone Pornography: First
Amendment Constraints on Shielding Children from Dial-A-Porn, 22 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 503, 505 (1985).
28. Third Report and Order, supra note 2, at paras. 7-8.
29. November amendment, supra note 5; April amendment, supra note 5.
30. November amendment, supra note 5, at (b)(1)-(2). Obscene communications
carry a fine in accordance with Title 18 of the United States Code, or imprisonment
for not more than two years, or both. Id. at (b)(2). Indecent communications carry a
fine of not more than $50,000 or imprisonment for not more than six months, or
both. Id.
31. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1983). The language of the original statute now appears as
subsection (a) and reads:
(a) Whoever-
(1) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communica-
tion by means of telephone-
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determined that section 223 as it then existed did not restrict
Dial-a-Porn,32 subsection (b) was added to the statute3 to ex-
tend the statute's prohibition specifically to obscene or inde-
cent pre-recorded phone messages and, thereby, cover Dial-a-
Porn. 4
(A) makes any comment, request, suggestion or proposal which is
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent;
(B) makes a telephone call, whether or not conversation ensues,
without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse,
threaten, or harass any person at the called number;
(C) makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly or contin-
uously to ring, with intent to harass any person at the called
number; or
(D) makes repeated telephone calls, during which conversation en-
sues, solely to harass any person at the called number; or
(2) knowingly permits any telephone facility under his control to be
used for any purpose prohibited by this section,
shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than six
months, or both.
32. Peter F. Cohalan, County Executive for Suffolk County, New York, at-
tempted, unsuccessfully, to have the FCC terminate Carlin Communications' Dial-a-
Porn service under section 223, as it then existed. In the Matter of Peter F. Cohalan
and the County of Suffolk, New York v. New York Tel. Co., FCC File No. E-83-14
(Mar. 31, 1983).
33. H.R. REP. No. 356, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2219. The amendment adding subsection (b) was
passed by both houses on November 18, 1983 and signed into law on December 8,
1983. Carlin 1, 749 F.2d at 115-16.
34. The full text of the 1983 statute read:
(1) Whoever knowingly -
(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communica-
tion, by means of telephone, makes (directly or by recording device)
any obscene or indecent communication for commercial purposes to
any person under eighteen years of age or to any other person with-
out that person's consent, regardless of whether the maker of such
communication placed the call; or
(B) permits any telephone facility under such person's control to be
used for an activity prohibited by subparagraph (A),
shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than six
months, or both.
(2) It is a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the defendant
restricted access to the prohibited communication to persons eighteen
years of age or older in accordance with procedures which the Commis-
sion shall prescribe by regulation.
(3) In addition to the penalties under paragraph (1), whoever, in the Dis-
trict of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communication, intention-
ally violates paragraph (1)(A) or (1)(B) shall be subject to a fine of not
more than $50,000 for each violation. For purposes of this paragraph,
each day of violation shall constitute a separate violation.
(4)(A) In addition to the penalties under paragraphs (1) and (3), whoever,
in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communica-
tion, violates paragraph (1)(A) or (1)(B) shall be subject to a civil
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
After the addition of subsection (b), the 1983 statute existed
unchanged for five years. Under this version of the statute,
message providers were subject to prosecution only for com-
munication of obscene or indecent messages to persons under
eighteen years of age.3 5 Compliance with FCC-promulgated
regulations, which required implementation of a system to re-
strict access by minors, was a complete defense to prosecution
under the 1983 statute.- Though subject to numerous chal-
lenges over the five years of its existence,37 the 1983 statute
and the FCC regulations were ultimately upheld by the Sec-
ond Circuit as applied to obscene, but not to indecent,
communications.
3
On April 28, 1988, the 1983 statute was amended (as part of
a school improvements act) to provide for prosecution for any
obscene or indecent telephone communication for commercial
use to any person, not just to persons under eighteen years of
age.39 The April amendment also eliminated any defense to
prosecution under the statute.4 °
On November 18, 1988, the statute was again amended (as
part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act) to provide for different pen-
alties for the communication of indecent versus obscene
messages by increasing the penalty for communication of ob-
scene messages.
41
fine of not more than $50,000 for each violation. For purposes of this
paragraph, each day of violation shall constitute a separate violation.
(B) A fine under this paragraph may be assessed either-
(i) by a court, pursuant to a civil action by the Commission or any
attorney employed by the Commission who is designated by the
Commission for such purposes, or
(ii) by the Commission after appropriate administrative proceedings.
(5) The Attorney General may bring a suit in the appropriate district
court of the United States to enjoin any act or practice which violates
paragraph (1)(A) or (1)(B). An injunction may be granted in accord-
ance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1983).
35. Id,
36. Id. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.201 (1987). See also infra note 87 for text of the cur-
rent regulations. The statute specifically directed the FCC to prescribe regulations
for restricting access to minors.
37. See, e.g., Carlin I, 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984); Carlin Communications v.
F.C.C., 787 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Carlin II]; Carlin Communications v.
F.C.C., 837 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Carlin III].
38. Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 560-61.
39. April amendment, supra note 5.
40. Id. See supra note 19 for full text of 1988 statute.
41. November amendment, supra note 5.
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The resulting 1988 statute cannot be upheld as constitu-
tional by any court without a fundamental change in constitu-
tional law. The statute is an outright governmental ban on the
communication of constitutionally protected indecent speech.
It is well settled that such speech may be regulated only if the
statute is narrowly drawn and serves a compelling governmen-
tal interest.42 No court has ever indicated any governmental
interest that justifies an outright prohibition on the communi-
cation of indecent speech to consenting adults. Because it
makes communication of obscene or indecent messages to all
persons illegal, the 1988 statute is not narrowly drawn to serve
the compelling governmental interest of protecting minors.43
Therefore, unless the Supreme Court holds that indecent
speech is no longer within the protection of the first amend-
ment, the 1988 statute cannot be upheld.
A U.S. District Court is the only court that has ruled on the
1988 statute. In Sable Communications v. FCC, the statute
was held to be overbroad and unconstitutional, at least as it
applies to "indecent" communications." The district court
viewed the issue as the breadth to be given to the Supreme
Court's holding in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation and concluded
that Pacifica has a very narrow application that does not vali-
date the 1988 statute.45 The court stated: "While the govern-
ment unquestionably has a legitimate interest in, e.g.,
protecting children from exposure to indecent dial-a-porn
messages, [section] 223(b) is not narrowly drawn to achieve
any such purpose. Its flat-out ban of indecent speech is con-
trary to the First Amendment.""
The district court severed the statute and issued an injunc-
tion prohibiting enforcement of the 1988 statute as to indecent
communications, but denied the injunction as to the statute's
42. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). See
also infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
43. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. By banning indecent recorded
phone messages, this statute could be applied to prohibit message services with soap
opera updates, teen-chat lines, horoscopes, jokes, or recorded bulletin boards, where
persons call in and record or listen to previously recorded messages, either for en-
tertainment, companionship or to discover common interests. For examples of such
services, see the San Francisco Bay Guardian, Feb. 8, 1989, at 56-57.
44. 692 F. Supp. 1208, 1209 (C.D. Cal. 1988), prob. juris. noted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3451
(U.S. Jan. 9, 1989) (Nos. 88-515, 88-525).
45. Id. (citing Pacfica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)).
46. Id.
1989]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
application to obscene communications.47 Pending the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Sable, the FCC is currently only
prosecuting under the obscenity portion of the 1988 statute."
In reference to the April amendment, Diane S. Killory,
General Counsel for the FCC, said she believed that "there
may be serious problems in sustaining the constitutionality of
such legislation," at least in its application to indecent
speech.49 She predicted that the Second Circuit's reaction to
the prohibition would be "swift and negative. '
B. The FCC Regulations
The future viability of the FCC regulations promulgated
under the 1983 statute51 remains in question pending the
Supreme Court's decision in Sable.52 The current regulations
5 3
were upheld in Carlin III as the least restrictive means avail-
able to regulate Dial-a-Porn.m This holding came only after
significant efforts by the FCC to determine effective and con-
stitutional methods to restrict minors' access to Dial-a-Porn,
and two Second Circuit decisions invalidating prior versions of
the regulations.-
Because these regulations currently exist unamended, and
because of the possibility that their application will be revived
by the Supreme Court in Sable, they are discussed here as via-
ble means of regulating Dial-a-Porn.
47. Id at 1210.
48. Telephone interview with Ann Siegel, FCC Special Counsel (Feb. 3, 1989).
49. On the Regulation of "Dial-a-Porn" Telephone Services and H.R. 1786 Before
the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the Committee on Energy
and Commerce U.S. House of Representatives, Order, F.C.C., slip op. (Sept. 30, 1987)
(LEXIS, FedComm library, FCC file). 'At the time of Killory's testimony, the April
amendment was pending approval in Congress.
50. Id.
51. 47 C.F.R. § 64.201 (1987). See infra note 87 for text of the current
regulations.
52. According to FCC special counsel, Ann Siegel, the regulations still exist, but
currently have no practical effect as a defense under section 223(b). Telephone in-
terview, supra note 48. Although they begin: "It is a defense to prosecution under
section 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934... that the defendant has taken
one of the [following] actions ... ." compliance with them would probably not be a
successful defense to prosecution under the 1988 statute. Id.
53. 47 C.F.R. § 64.201 (1987).
54. Carlin III, 837 F.2d 546, 556 (2d Cir. 1988).
55. See First Report and Order, supra note 21; Second Report and Order, supra
note 24; Third Report and Order, supra note 2.




The first set of FCC regulations developed under the au-
thority of the 1983 statute provided a defense to a message
provider who restricted access to minors either by operating
its service only between the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m., or
by requiring payment by credit card before transmission of the
message.57 These regulations were held invalid by the Second
Circuit in Carlin . 58 The court expressed its concern over reg-
ulating Dial-a-Porn messages because the regulations were not
content-neutral. 59
The court rejected the FCC's argument that the 1984 regula-
tions should be upheld as a reasonable time, place and manner
restriction,60 and determined that a higher standard was appli-
cable, stating: "[B]ecause the regulation is content based ...
[in that] it does not apply to all dial-it services, but only to
those transmitting obscene or indecent messages,... we scru-
tinize it more closely."'" Under this higher standard, the regu-
lation must further a compelling governmental interest and be
"closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment [of first
amendment rights]." 6 The government bears the burden of
showing that the compelling state interest could not be served
by restrictions "less intrusive on protected forms of expres-
sion. "63 If even the least restrictive means of regulation is un-
57. 47 C.F.R. § 64.201 (1984). Prepayment by credit card is a means viable only
for restricting access to live Dial-a-Porn messages, since with recorded messages the
caller has no contact with a live person who could take his or her credit card
number.
58. 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984).
59. Id at 121. The Supreme Court has long held that regulations enacted for the
purpose of restraining speech on the basis of content presumptively violate the first
amendment. Chicago Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
60. Carlin I, 749 F.2d at 120. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50 (1976), the Court in a plurality opinion upheld adult film zoning ordinances as
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions.
61. Carlin I, 749 F.2d at 121. The court followed the approach taken in Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), in which the Supreme
Court held that "when regulation is based on the content of the speech, governmen-
tal action must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication has not
been prohibited merely because public officials disapprove of the speaker's views."
Id at 536. The Court further stated that it is a given that the state cannot stifle
speech just because it disagrees with the speaker's view. Carlin I, 749 F.2d at 121.
62. Carlin I, 749 F.2d at 121. The court held that "the interest in protecting
minors from salacious matter is no doubt quite compelling" (citing Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-43 (1968)).
63. Id (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)).
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reasonable, the state may not regulate at all.64
According to the Second Circuit, the 1984 regulations vio-
lated the first amendment because they were both overinclu-
sive and underinclusive. They denied access to adults during
certain restricted hours, but failed to restrict access by youths
during the allowable hours of operation.
The FCC failed to demonstrate that the regulatory scheme
was "well tailored to its ends or that those ends could not be
met by less drastic means. '67 It also failed to meet the "high,
but necessary, standard" of showing that the regulations were
chosen after a "thorough, careful, and comprehensive investi-
gation and analysis" as the least restrictive means to regulate
Dial-a-Porn.6  The regulations were held invalid, and the
court chose not to examine the question of the constitutional-
ity of the 1983 statute.69
2. 1985 Regulations
The FCC's second attempt to institute Dial-a-Porn regula-
tions7" was struck down by the Second Circuit in Carlin 11.71
These regulations removed time restrictions as a defense to
prosecution under the 1983 statute, but added a new defense:
requirement by the service provider that an access or identifi-





68. d at 123. The court noted: "we presume that the Justice Department will
continue its earlier policy of not enforcing section 223(b) without a regulation gov-
erning dial-a-porn." I&
69. The court stated that "courts should not anticipate a question of constitu-
tional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it." Id at 118.
70. 47 C.F.R. § 64.201 (1985) (adopted October 10, 1985).
71. 787 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1986).
72. The full text of this set of regulations read:
It is a defense to prosecution under section 223(b) of the Communications
Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 223(b) (1983), that the defendant has
taken either of the following steps to restrict access to the communications
prohibited thereunder:
(a) Requires an authorized access or identification code before transmission
of the subject message begins, where the defendant
(1) has issued the code by mailing it to the applicant after reasonably
ascertaining through receipt of a written application that the appli-
cant is not under eighteen years of age; and
(2) has established a procedure to cancel immediately the code of any
person upon written, telephonic or other notice to the defendant's
[Vol. 11:493
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Under the access code approach, the message provider issues
an access or identification code to the customer only after the
message provider determines, through an application process,
that the customer is not under eighteen years old. Thereafter,
the caller cannot hear the message until he or she enters the
access code. The code allows access only to the message ser-
vice to which the customer has applied.73
In developing this set of regulations, the FCC considered the
use of "blocking" as an effective means of regulation, but ulti-
mately rejected it.74 There are two basic types of blocking:
network blocking and customer premises blocking. Network
blocking is a system by which outgoing telephone calls from a
blocked residence or business to a "976" number are stopped
at the telephone company central offices.75 In customer prem-
ises blocking, the customer installs a device at his or her resi-
dence or business.76 This device is available at a moderate
price and is programmed by the phone customer to block one
or several numbers from being dialed.77 The FCC found both
types of blocking to be constitutionally flawed, as they were
either overbroad or too burdensome to customers. 78
business office that such code has been lost, stolen, or used by a per-
son or persons under the age of eighteen, or that such code is no
longer desired; or
(b) Requires payment by credit card before transmission of the messages].
47 C.F.R. § 64.201 (1985).
73. Carlin II, 787 F.2d at 853.
74. Second Report and Order, supra note 24, at paras. 13 and 27. The FCC solic-
ited and received comments from more than thirty parties (including NYNEX,
AT&T, Carlin Communications, the ACLU, and Pacific Bell) on possible means of
restricting access. The FCC rejected all network blocking by which outgoing calls
are impeded at the phone company central offices. It found exchange blocking con-
stitutionally flawed because it blocks all 976 calls, not just Dial-a-Porn messages, and
ineffective because MANS numbers are not legally or technically required to be as-
signed to 976 exchanges. It rejected number blocking as inadequate to handle the
large number of adult message providers currently operating. Id at paras. 9-17.
The FCC also rejected customer premises blocking because it was not the least
restrictive means available, as requiring phone customers to purchase blocking de-
vices misallocates the burden of restricting access. Id at para. 27.
75. Id at para. 10. Network Blocking generally blocks all 976 calls, not just Dial-
a-Porn calls. Id. at para. 13. This is because all phone numbers with a certain prefix
can be blocked, e.g., all 976 numbers, but one specific phone number, e.g., 976-5555,
cannot. Telephone interview with Lisa Zanville, Pacific Bell Director of Media Com-
munications (Feb. 10, 1989).
76. Id at para. 10.
77. Id. at para. 27. These present special problems because the devices may be
disconnected by children.
78. Id at paras. 27, 28. See also infra notes 162-66.
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In reviewing the amended regulations, the Second Circuit in
Carlin Hf reiterated the legal standard set forth in Carlin L"9
The court was again unconvinced that the regulations were
the least restrictive means of serving the compelling govern-
ment interest.80
The court did not rule out use of access codes altogether,
nor rule on the constitutionality of access codes.8 1 It held that
because the FCC failed to consider adequately the implemen-
tation of customer premises blocking (and the shifting of the
cost of the device from the customer to either the message
providers or the phone companies), there could not be a find-
ing that the regulations were the least restrictive means avail-
able. 2  The court acknowledged that, after a thorough
examination of the alternatives suggested by the court, the
FCC may still find access codes to be the least restrictive
means for regulating Dial-a-Porn. 3 The court did not reach
the issue of the constitutionality of the 1983 statute in Carlin
11.84
3. Current Regulations
In response to the Second Circuit's decision in Carlin II, the
FCC introduced a third set of regulations under section 223(b)
on May 12, 1987. These regulations are currently in exist-
ence.8 5 They add "scrambling of messages"8 6 as an alternative
79. Carlin II, 787 F.2d at 855. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64 for dis-
cussion of the standard.
80. Carlin II, 787 F.2d at 856. The court expressed concern about the feasibility
of an access code system over New York Telephone's one-way MANS Network
which does not permit the caller to communicate an access code to the phone com-
pany or service provider. Id
81. Id The court did express concern over the potential chilling effect of the
written application and identification procedure necessary to obtain an access code.
Id. at 856 n.7.
82. Id. at 856. The court stated that blocking devices may be the least restrictive
means for complying with the statute and questioned why the FCC had only consid-
ered that phone customers would pay for the devices, rather than those who eco-
nomically benefit from the services. Id See supra notes 74-78 and infra notes 162-
66 and accompanying text for a discussion of blocking devices.
83. Carlin II, 787 F.2d at 856-57.
84. I& at 855.
85. 47 C.F.R. § 64.201 (1987).
86. Scrambling would require the message providers to scramble all their Dial-a-
Porn messages, so that they would be unintelligible to the caller without the use of a
descrambler. Third Report and Order, supra note 2, at para. 40. To access the
message, the customer would need a descrambling device which is portable and fits
over the earpiece of any telephone. Id at n.25. Thus, scrambling restricts access
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method of restricting access by minors to the existing options
of requiring credit card prepayment or establishing an access
code system.87 These regulations provide an additional safe-
guard: when the message service provider supplies Dial-a-Porn
messages over Mass Announcement Network Services
(MANS), such as AT&T's "Dial-It 900" service, it must request
that AT&T provide billing notification of all calls made to the
MANS, so that customers will be informed each month of all
outgoing calls made to 976 numbers.88
Carlin Communications, along with several other Dial-a-
Porn message providers, 9 again challenged the constitutional-
from all telephones, but allows access from any telephone by adults with descram-
blers. Id. Minors' access to descramblers could be limited and parental supervision
could be enhanced, because descramblers are observable within the household. Id. at
para 40.
87. The text of the current regulations reads:
It is a defense to prosecution under section 223(b) of the Communications
Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 223(b), that the defendant has taken one
of the actions set forth in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of this section to restrict
access to prohibited communications to persons eighteen years of age or
older, and has additionally complied with paragraph (d) of this section,
where applicable:
(a) Requires payment by credit card before transmission of the message; or
(b) Requires an authorized access or identification code before transmission
of the message, and where the defendant has:
(1) issued the code by mailing it to the applicant after reasonably ascer-
taining through receipt of a written application that the applicant is
not under eighteen years of age; and
(2) established a procedure to cancel immediately the code of any per-
son upon written, telephonic or other notice to the defendant's busi-
ness office that such code has been lost, stolen, or used by a person
or persons under the age of eighteen, or that such code is no longer
desired; or
(c) Scrambles the message using frequency inversion techniques so that it is
unintelligible and incomprehensible to the calling party without use of a
descrambler by the calling party; and
(d) Where the defendant is a message sponsor or subscriber to mass an-
nouncement services tariffed at this Commission and such defendant
prior to the transmission of the message has requested in writing to the
carrier providing the public announcement service that calls to his
message service be subject to billing notification as an adult telephone
message service.
47 C.F.R. § 64.210 (1987).
88. Third Report and Order, supra note 2, at para. 47. The theory behind this
requirement is that it facilitates parental supervision. When minors actually obtain
access to Dial-a-Porn messages by using a descrambler or access code, parents will
discover the child's access on receipt of the phone bill listing the calls. The FCC
notes that this requirement only applies to AT&T's MANS Network, as it has not
been shown to be workable for interstate calls to local services. I&
89. Sapphire of Arizona, Inc., Joy Communications of California, Inc., Lynx
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ity of the FCC regulations and, for the first time, the regula-
tions were upheld in Carlin i1. 90 The court adhered to the
standard set out in Carlin I and Carlin Il19 and held that the
FCC had met its burden by showing that the compelling gov-
ernmental interest in protecting minors from obscene
messages could not be achieved by less restrictive means.92
The court's holding supported the FCC's conclusion that
providing the alternatives of scrambling, access codes, and
credit card prepayment was a "feasible and effective way to
serve [the] compelling state interest."9 " Noting that any at-
tempt to restrict speech must not be unreasonable,9 the court
also found that the options offered under these regulations did
not unreasonably restrict access by adults, 5 because adults
could continue to have access to the messages with minimal
inconvenience, while access by minors would be restrictedY6
Communications of California, Inc., Sable Communications of California, Inc., Sap-
phire of Colorado, Inc., Sapphire Communications of Florida, Inc., Sapphire of Geor-
gia, Inc., Sapphire of Iowa, Inc., Sapphire Communications of Kentucky, Inc.,
Sapphire of Louisiana, Inc., Joy Communications of Maryland, Inc., Sapphire Com-
munications of Maryland, Inc., Joy Communications of Michigan, Inc., Sapphire of
Michigan, Inc., Sapphire of Minnesota, Inc., Sapphire of Nebraska, Inc., Sapphire of
Nevada, Inc., Sapphire of Oregon, Inc., Joy Communications of Pennsylvania, Inc.,
Sapphire Communications of Pennsylvania, Inc., Sapphire Communications of
Texas, Inc., Sapphire of Virginia, Inc., Sapphire of Washington, Inc., and Sapphire of
Washington, D.C., Inc.
90. 837 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1988).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
92. Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 556. The court held that the FCC adequately consid-
ered the feasibility of the cost of customer premises blocking equipment, reasonably
assumed $25 would be an average cost per household, and reasonably concluded this
high cost was not justified, because even if the cost was shifted to the service pro-
vider, they would potentially be required to provide the devices to the entire country
to restrict interstate access to these messages. The court also noted the problems
with blocking devices which are easily disabled by minors and block access by adults.
Id.
93. Id. at 555.
94. Id. at 557.
95. Id. The court directed the FCC to reopen its proceedings in order to consider
adding, as alternatives to restrict access, a beep-tone device and any other feasible
and effective methods that become available that are less restrictive to adult access.
The FCC is to reopen its proceedings when such a device is manufactured in proto-
type, so that its scientific feasibility can be determined. Id at 556.
For discussion of the beep-tone device, see infra notes 175-81 and accompanying
text.
96. Id The court analogizes the regulations to requirements in M. S. News Co.
v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1983) (sexually oriented materials were required
to be displayed behind blinder racks); Upper Midwest Booksellers Ass'n v. City of
Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1985) (sexually explicit materials were required
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Constitutionality of 1983 Statute
In Carlin III, the Second Circuit, in addition to upholding
the FCC regulations, finally determined the constitutionality
of the 1983 statute.97 Carlin Communications had argued that
the statutory language of "obscene or indecent" was overbroad
and vague.98 The Second Circuit stated that it was necessary
for the drafters to include "indecent" in the text of section
223(b) because of the Supreme Court holding in FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation." The court concluded, however, that
although Pacifica justifies the regulation of indecent radio
broadcasts, it does not justify the regulation of indecent phone
messages.1°° The court noted the opinion of Cruz v. Ferre,1'0
in which the Eleventh Circuit held that Pacifica could not be
extended to uphold a city ordinance regulating distribution of
indecent material over cable television. The Cruz court distin-
guished cable television from radio broadcasting on two
grounds: first, cable subscribers must affirmatively subscribe
in order to receive the cable service; and second, technology
exists that allows parents to prevent access by their children
to objectionable cable programs.
10 2
Other courts have reasoned that, although there is a compel-
ling governmental interest in protecting minors from indecent
speech, the ability of parents to control their children's access
to objectionable speech on cable television, together with the
first amendment right of adults to receive indecent material,
eliminated the need for regulation of indecent material on
cable television.0 3
For some of the same reasons asserted in Cruz, the Second
to be kept in sealed wrappers behind opaque cover or in a separate adults-only sec-
tion of the bookstore).
97. Carlin II, 837 F.2d at 557-58. See supra note 34 for the text of 1983 statute.
98. Carlin Iff, 837 F.2d at 558.
99. Id The Court in PacQ'ica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), held that the FCC could regu-
late a radio broadcast that was indecent but not obscene, under 18 U.S.C. § 1464
(1976), and upheld the assessment of a fine. Id at 738. The Court stated: "We sim-
ply hold that when the [FCC] finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of
its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene." Id, at 750-51.
The court in Carlin III stated that the legislature's inclusion of "indecent" in sec-
tion 223(b) was "clearly made with [Pac flca] in mind." 837 F.2d at 558.
100. Pac(flca, 438 U.S. at 560.
101. 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985).
102. Id. at 1420.
103. See, e.g., Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. de-
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Circuit found that telephone calls over private lines "differ
significantly" from the public broadcast in Pacifica, and there-
fore, the Pacifica holding does not justify the regulation of in-
decent phone messages.1°4 The court concluded that because
the 1983 statute specifically authorized criminal prosecution
for communication of obscene or indecent phone messages,0 5
to give the term "indecent" in the statute any meaning other
than the definition of obscenity under Miller v. California '06
would make the 1983 statute unconstitutional.0 7 The court
stated that Congress intended to regulate adult phone
messages only so far as it was constitutional to do so." a There-
fore, the court did not strike down the entire statute, but in-
stead construed it to avoid constitutional problems. 0 9 The
court held that the "or indecent" language was invalid and
could be stricken from the statute," 0 but it upheld the remain-
der of the statute as fully operative and constitutional."'
The mystery remaining after Carlin III is why the court
thoroughly reviewed the FCC regulations, declared them valid
under the strict scrutiny standard as the least restrictive
means of restricting access to minors, and then held that the
nied 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Community Television v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D.
Utah 1982).
104. Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 560. The Supreme Court in Pactica emphasized that
"of all forms of communications, it is broadcasting that has... the most limited First
Amendment protection." 438 U.S. at 748.
105. See supra note 34 for the text of the 1983 statute. The court noted that the
Pac ftca court did not hold that the indecent radio broadcast justified criminal prose-
cution under the applicable statute; only a fine was imposed. Pac(fia, 438 U.S. at
750.
106. 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see supra note 7.
107. Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 560.
108. I&
109. I. at 558. The court stated as a preliminary matter that it is required to
construe the statute to avoid constitutional problems if it is susceptible to such a
limiting construction (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). This is based
on the belief that Congress would, in making legislation, "err on the side of funda-
mental constitutional liberties when its legislation implicates those liberties." Id.
(quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 697 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
110. Whether an unconstitutional provision is severable from the remainder
of the statute in which it appears is largely a question of legislative intent,
but the presumption is in favor of severability. Unless it is evident that the
Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its
power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped
if what is left is fully operative as law.
Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 561 (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc. 468 U.S. 641, 653 (1984)).
111. IdZ.
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1983 statute, to which they provided a defense, applied only to
obscene speech. The only reason for subjecting a regulation to
a standard of strict scrutiny is to justify the interference with
indecent speech, which has first amendment protection. Ob-
scene speech can be regulated without these more demanding
constitutional concerns, as it is outside the scope of first
amendment protection.112 Because the court found the regula-
tions valid as the least restrictive means to regulate Dial-a-
Porn, the 1983 statute should have been upheld as applied to
both obscene and indecent speech.
113
The Second Circuit did not articulate why it held that inde-
cent telephone messages could not be regulated under the 1983
statute. It merely stated that because private phone conversa-
tions are different from radio broadcasts, Pacifica does not
justify regulating indecent phone conversations. 114
The court clearly recognized, in line with its prior holdings
in Carlin I and Carlin II, that indecent speech can constitu-
tionally be regulated, in light of the compelling governmental
interest in protecting minors, if the restrictions are narrowly
drawn and proven to be the least restrictive means available to
regulate the communication.15 It clearly held that the FCC
regulations met this standard."
16
The court did not expressly find that there is no compelling
governmental interest in protecting minors from indecent, as
opposed to obscene, speech. Nor did it find that indecent
speech is less harmful to minors than obscene speech and does
not, therefore, need to be regulated. Yet, the court signifi-
cantly narrowed the scope of regulation in the area of Dial-a-
Porn by limiting the 1983 statute to obscene communications.
The Second Circuit based its holding on a comparison of tel-
ephone communications to cable television in reliance on Cruz
v. Ferre. 1 7 Although it is true that Dial-a-Porn is more simi-
112. The Supreme Court did warn in Miller v. California that, although obscene
material is unprotected by the first amendment, schemes designed to regulate ob-
scenity must be "carefully limited because of the inherent dangers of undertaking to
regulate any form of expression." 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64 for a discussion of the heightened
scrutiny standard.
114. Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 560.
115. Id at 557-58. See also supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
116. Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 556-57.
117. -See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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lar to cable television than it is to broadcasting,"' it can still
be distinguished. Cable is accessible only by having cable ser-
vice brought into the home and by subscribing to particular
cable programming. Presumably, this is done by parents."19
Limiting the regulation of cable television to cover obscene
material only can, therefore, be justified on the ground that
the ability of parents to control the flow of cable programming
into their homes lessens the need for regulation to restrict ac-
cess by minors.
Dial-a-Porn messages, on the other hand, are currently ac-
cessible to minors whether or not the parents have chosen to
permit entry of the messages into their home. Minors can
simply pick up the phone and dial a 976 number they read in a
paper or got from a friend at school. 2° Without regulations
that limit access to indecent, as well as obscene, Dial-a-Porn
messages and that require message providers to comply with
these regulations or risk criminal prosecution, these messages
will continue to be readily available to minors.' 2'
While the 1988 statute is overbroad in its total prohibition of
both indecent and obscene speech to all listeners, the Second
Circuit's holding in Carlin III restricting the 1983 statute to
obscene communications did not go far enough. The 1983 stat-
ute, together with the FCC regulations as a defense, if strictly
enforced, would adequately restrict access by minors, thereby
serving the governmental interest without unnecessarily in-
fringing on first amendment protected speech. The provision
118. Broadcasting is more easily accessible, pervasive and invasive than either
Dial-a-Porn messages or cable television and requires no more action or choice on
the part of the listener than merely turning on a radio or television. See generaly
FCC v. Pacifica Found, 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978).
119. If the parent does bring cable service into the home, in order to protect chil-
dren or other immature viewers from unsuitable programming, subscribers need
only use a free "lockbox" or "parental key" available from the cable company. Cruz
v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420-21 (11th Cir. 1985).
120. "We do recognize, however, that absent the unlikely event that adult
messages disappear entirely, the possibility that minors can readily access them by
telephone will remain." Testimony of Diane S. Killory, General Counsel, Federal
Communications Commission, Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and
Finance of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives,
slip op. 18-19 (Sept. 30, 1987) (LEXIS, FedComm library, FCC file).
121. Many phone companies are extending to customers the option of blocking
access to all 976 numbers for a one-time fee of two dollars. In California, Pacific Bell
and General Telephone were ordered by the California Public Utilities Commission
to offer this blocking. See infra text accompanying notes 141-42. This type of block-




for a defense under the statute makes it narrowly drawn to
serve the compelling interest.
V
The Ninth Circuit's Approach to Restricting
Dial-a-Porn
The Ninth Circuit recently reviewed the Dial-a-Porn issue
in Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone
& Telegraph Co. (Mountain Bell).22 Although the court recog-
nized that "the First Amendment does not permit a flat-out
ban of indecent as opposed to obscene speech,' 1 23 its holding
could have serious implications for the future of the Dial-a-
Porn industry.
Carlin Communications (Carlin) sued a regional phone com-
pany (Mountain States) under state public utility law' 24 and
asserted a federal civil rights claim under section 1983.125 Car-
lin sought to enjoin the phone company from refusing to carry
Carlin's messages on its 976 network. 26
The Ninth Circuit held that a regional phone company could
validly institute and execute a "policy"''" to refuse 976 service
to any message provider who offers "adult entertainment
messages with sexually-oriented content."'12 Whether the
messages are unlawful (obscene) or lawful is immaterial."
The court held that, as long as such a policy does not consti-
tute state action, 3 0 a public utility does not violate its duty to
122. 827 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1586 (1988).
123. Id. at 1296.
124. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-334(A) (1985). The text of the applicable section
of the statute reads:
(A) A public service corporation shall not, as to rates, charges, service, facil-
ities or in any other respect, make or grant any preference or advan-
tage to any person or subject any person to any prejudice or
disadvantage.
125. Mountain Bell, 827 F.2d at 1293.
126. Id. The court did not review the 1983 statute or the FCC regulations.
127. Id. at 1293.
128. Brief for Appellant at 16-17, Mountain Bell 827 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1987).
129. Mountain Bell, 827 F.2d at 1297. The court agreed with an Eleventh Circuit
opinion which held, similarly, that a privately-owned public utility could restrict ser-
vice based on message content if it decided for business reasons that it did not wish
to transmit sexually explicit messages. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1361 (11th Cir. 1986).
130. The court held that the initial termination of Carlin's service after threats of
criminal prosecution by the deputy county attorney was unlawful prior restraint of
the kind struck down in Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), and was "state
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offer service without discrimination under the applicable state
statute.131
Mountain States did not single out Carlin for adverse treat-
ment, but instead excluded all adult entertainment messages
under its policy. The court held that this was a distinction
based on a reasonable business classification and was not
discriminatory. 32
In sharp contrast to the Second Circuit's analysis of Dial-a-
Porn in Carlin III, which likened phone communications to
cable television,131 the Ninth Circuit stated that, for purposes
of its 976 service, Mountain States "resembles less a common
carrier than it does a small radio station."'" The court held
that Mountain States and Carlin are free to contract or not
contract as they wish,135 but declined to hold that state public
utility law compels Mountain States to carry "salacious or
pornographic" messages (lawful or unlawful) on its 976
network.
1 8
Thus, the Ninth Circuit upheld action by a phone company
that constitutes an absolute ban of both obscene and indecent
phone messages, as well as any other types of messages that
the phone company includes under the broad heading of
"adult entertainment." In this sense, although it does not ad-
dress section 223(b) or the accompanying regulations, Moun-
tain Bell does run counter to the Second Circuit's holdings in
Carlin I, Carlin II, and Carlin III, which require heightened
scrutiny in regulating constitutionally protected speech.1
7
The court's holding in Mountain Bell is especially dangerous
action" for purposes of the federal civil rights statute and, thus, a violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Mountain Bell, 827 F.2d at 1295-96.
131. Mountain Bell, 827 F.2d at 1293-94.
132. Id. See also Dollar-A-Day Rent A Car Sys. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., 22 Ariz. App. 270, 526 P.2d 1068 (1974) (holding that a content-based restriction
allowing phone company to exclude price advertising from Yellow Pages, and
thereby refusing to carry plaintiff's ad at all, was not impermissible discrimination).
133. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
134. Mountain Bell, 827 F.2d at 1294.
135. Id at 1297. The court stated that although the state may not censor pornog-
raphy without a prior judicial determination of its obscenity, private companies, such
as newspapers, television networks, and publishers, may do so. Therefore, the court
modified Mountain States' public utility status to permit censorship.
136. Id at 1295.
137. See supra notes 51-116 and accompanying text. Painstaking efforts were
taken by the Second Circuit to restrict any regulation of Dial-a-Porn to one that was




in two respects. First, by allowing phone companies to main-
tain this type of policy, the Ninth Circuit condones censorship
based solely on message content. Such a policy allows phone
companies to define "adult entertainment" and to refuse ser-
vice to any message provider who offers messages they believe
fall under this category. The court thus upholds a potential
ban on constitutionally protected speech. 3
Second, this kind of policy could completely close the chan-
nels of communication for the protected speech of sexually ex-
plicit message providers. Because a phone company is a public
utility with a monopoly in its service area, when it refuses ser-
vice to a message provider, that channel of communication for
the entire area is completely closed. If one phone company
institutes such a policy, the message provider must go to an-
other area, serviced by a different phone company, in order to
disseminate his "adult entertainment" messages. If all phone
companies choose to institute such policies, the message pro-
vider will not have a vehicle for the dissemination of his
messages anywhere in the country-a complete ban will be
effected.1
3 9
Because the Supreme Court denied Carlin Communications'
petition for certiorari, 14 0 the constitutionality of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's holding in Mountain Bell remains in question.
VI
Attempts by Public Utilities Commissions and
Phone Companies to Restrict
Dial-a-Porn
Reacting to public concern about Dial-a-Porn and its ease of
accessibility by minors, phone companies and state public utili-
ties commissions are taking action.
In December 1987, the California Public Utilities Commis-
138. Not only does this threaten Dial-a-Porn services that communicate protected
speech, but it also threatens 976 numbers that offer jokes, party lines, horse racing
reports, soap opera updates, etc., which could be subject to a phone company's defini-
tion of "adult entertainment." All these messages could be refused phone service
consistent with a privately-owned phone company's "policy."
139. The only potential channel of communication left for these types of tele-
phone messages might be on MANS networks such as AT&T's "Dial-It 900" service.
It is not clear if the holding in Mountain Bell would apply to MANS systems. If so,
the Dial-a-Porn message provider could potentially have no means to disseminate his
message.
140. 108 S. Ct. 1586 (1988).
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sion (California PUC) ordered California phone companies to
let customers cut off all 976 calls by offering central office
blocking for a one-time charge of two dollars for residential
customers, five dollars for business customers, and no charge
for low income "Lifeline" customers. 41 Public outrage at be-
ing charged to block a service which was never wanted in the
first place was so overwhelming that Pacific Bell now offers
blocking at no charge.142
Although blocking has been consistently rejected by the
FCC and the Second Circuit as a method for restricting access
under section 223(b) because it is too costly and problematic, 43
it is the only method most phone companies currently have to
restrict access, short of disconnecting the phone lines of Dial-
a-Porn providers. All other methods require implementation
by the message providers.'"
On March 11, 1988, the California PUC took a giant step to-
wards eliminating Dial-a-Porn services in ruling that Pacific
Bell could disconnect all sexually explicit 976 numbers.145 The
PUC had previously ruled that it was unable to regulate the
content of Dial-a-Porn, as it believed such action would
abridge the service providers' first amendment rights. 46 How-
ever, the California PUC now believes that it can count on the
Ninth Circuit Mountain Bell decision as supportive precedent
for its action. 47 As a result, although Pacific Bell would like
to permanently cut off all service to Dial-a-Porn providers,
148
it continues to offer service to all providers of sexually explicit
recorded messages pending a decision in a declaratory relief
action it filed to determine the constitutionality of the Califor-
nia PUC's order.
149
141. C.P.U.C. Decision No. 87-12-038, Interim Order (Dec. 9, 1987).
142. Telephone interview with Lisa Zanville, Pacific Bell Director of Media Com-
munications (Feb. 10, 1989).
143. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
145. C.P.U.C. Order No. 88-03-042 (Mar. 11, 1988); PUC Says PacBell Can Discon-
nect Dial-A-Porn, San Francisco Chron., Mar. 24, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
146. PUC Says PacBell Can Disconnect Dial-A-Porn, San Francisco Chron., Mar.
24, 1988, at A18, col. 4.
147. Id. Pacific Bell does not feel certain it can rely on Mountain Bell to discon-
nect all Dial-a-Porn, since Mountain Bell involved an Arizona phone company and
Arizona law. Telephone interview, supra note 142.
148. Telephone interview, supra note 142.
149. Pacific Bell v. Epsilon Communications, No. C-88-1010-EFL (filed Mar. 23,
1988). Telephone interview, supra note 142. See infra notes 167-74 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of Pacific Bell's new 900 area code network.
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The 1988 statute certainly provides additional support for
any restrictive action taken by phone companies, including the
disconnection of all Dial-a-Porn numbers, by making inter-
state Dial-a-Porn communications illegal. 15° Whether Pacific
Bell and other phone companies actually choose to suffer the
drastic economic consequences of refusing to carry sexually
explicit messages"'1 and whether the 1988 statute will be up-
held by the Supreme Court remain to be seen.
VII
Constitutional Alternatives to Restrict Access to
Dial-a-Porn
From 1983 to 1987, the FCC solicited comments from nu-
merous parties regarding ways to restrict minors' access to
Dial-a-Porn messages, in order to determine the most effec-
tive, least burdensome way to regulate the industry. 2 They
eventually settled on three methods: scrambling of messages,
requirement of access code entry, and credit card prepayment.
These provided the only defense to criminal prosecution under
the 1983 statute.153
As noted in section III, these regulations are in limbo pend-
ing the Supreme Court ruling on the 1988 statute, which elimi-
nates all defenses.1M In light of the obvious need for a
constitutional, effective method of regulating the Dial-a-Porn
industry, several different approaches and their respective
limitations should be considered.
The best approach to regulating Dial-a-Porn would be one
that restricts access by children, but places no burden, eco-
nomic or otherwise, on any party. If one party must bear
some burden, however, it should be the message providers.
Although their right to free speech is at issue, they are also
150. Although some phone companies operate entirely intrastate, any recorded
message services that can be accessed interstate by dialing the appropriate long dis-
tance area code are subject to section 223(b). See supra note 19.
151. See supra note 2. Pacific Bell wants to cut off all service to Dial-a-Porn prov-
iders. The company's position is that the harm to Pacific Bell's reputation suffered
as a consequence of carrying Dial-a-Porn is not worth the $14 million they made
from Dial-a-Porn in 1988. Telephone interview, supra note 142.
152. See generally First Report and Order, supra note 21; Second Report and Or-
der, supra note 24; Third Report and Order, supra note 2.
153. 47 C.F.R. § 64.201 (1987). See also supra note 87 for the full text of the
regulations.
154. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
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the ones who benefit economically from these commercial
phone messages.
155
In a cost-benefit analysis, the message provider would have
to determine whether or not it was economically beneficial to
continue providing its message service with the added cost of
compliance with the regulations under the 1983 statute. If a
company decided it was not economically beneficial to comply
with the regulations, it would have to stop providing Dial-a-
Porn messages or risk criminal prosecution.
Phone companies also profit from Dial-a-Porn and other 976
services. 156 In light of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Mountain
Bell, any burden put on phone companies should be minimal,
since any substantial decrease in the economic incentive for
carrying these services might result in a choice by a phone
company to implement a policy of refusing service to providers
of "adult entertainment" messages.
5 7
The Second Circuit has clearly stated that having phone
companies and message providers bear the financial burden of
restricting access by minors is preferable to having the cus-
tomers who want to restrict access bear that burden.'5 Also
at issue, however, are the first amendment rights of Dial-a-
Porn customers who wish to hear these messages.
A. Access Codes and Scrambling
Both the access code and the scrambling methods place the
burden of access on the willing adult listener and the message
provider. They require the potential Dial-a-Porn customer
either to fill out and submit applications to every service he
wishes to access,159 or to buy a descrambler at an average cost
of fifteen dollars.16 0
Message providers bear the costs of implementation of an
155. See generally Carlin II, 787 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1986). See also supra note 2.
156. See generally Third Report and Order, supra note 2, at paras. 6-8.
157. See supra notes 122-40 and accompanying text.
158. Carlin II, 787 F.2d at 855-56.
159. Minors can still gain access to these services by stealing access codes from
parents or other adults, or obtaining codes through falsified applications. See supra
notes 72-73.
160. See generally Carlin III, 837 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1988). The court noted: "Fif-
teen dollars does not seem like an excessive cost when one considers prices for other
forms of entertainment in this day and age." Id. at 556. The court stated that the




access code or scrambling system. To some extent, Dial-a-
Porn customers will share in any economic burden placed on
message providers, as message providers will likely pass on the
increased cost of compliance with the regulations to their cus-
tomers. As customers use these message services as a form of
entertainment, any reasonable cost may be viewed as similar
to that charged for many other types of entertainment, such as
movies, books, or magazines. The burden of waiting to obtain
an access code or buy a descrambler, however, remains an im-
pediment to the customer's first amendment rights.
As no burden is placed on phone customers who want no
access to Dial-a-Porn, scrambling and access codes are a pre-
ferred means of restricting access. Further, the Second Circuit
held that the compelling government interest in protecting
minors could not be served by less restrictive means and that
the alternatives of access codes and scrambling did not unrea-




Blocking of calls to 976 numbers can be instituted either by
the customer-through use of a device installed at his or her
residence or business-or by the phone company at its central
offices.1 2 The FCC has recognized various problems with
blocking devices. 63 Although no burden is placed on one who
wishes to access the messages, blocking is costly for phone
companies to implement, and the customer who wants to
block 976 numbers may ultimately pay a fee.'6 Moreover,
children can easily unplug or reprogram devices installed on
the customers' premises.165 The greatest first amendment con-
cern with blocking is that most devices block access to all 976
numbers, not just Dial-a-Porn, for both children and adults.'6
161. Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 556-57.
162. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of blocking
devices.
163. See generally First Rdport and Order, supra note 21; Second Report and Or-
der, supra note 24; Third Report and Order, supra note 2.
164. Third Report and Order, supra note 2, at paras. 33-35.
165. I& at para. 34.
166. 1& at para. 33. Blocking is currently an all or nothing proposition, since
nothing more specific than a prefix can be blocked. Therefore, by blocking all 976
prefix numbers, all recorded phone messages are blocked, not just sexually explicit
Dial-a-Porn messages. Telephone interview, supra note 142.
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2. 900 Area Code Network
Some of the constitutional concerns with blocking as a
means of restricting access to Dial-a-Porn may be overcome if
phone companies implement a 900 area code system for all re-
corded phone messages.167 Such a system allows for the as-
signment of all recorded messages to various prefixes on a 900
area code network and, specifically, all sexually explicit Dial-
a-Porn to only one prefix. 168 This would enable phone custom-
ers to selectively block only Dial-a-Porn, or any other un-
wanted message services, without blocking all recorded
message services (such as messages from Santa Claus, teen
chat lines, or weather and time information). The customer
would be able to choose a particular selective blocking plan,
which would be implemented by the phone company.169 Pa-
cific Bell plans to have a 900 system in operation by July
1989.170
There are problems with this type of system. First, the
phone company operating the network, by monitoring the
phone lines of recorded message providers, would make a uni-
lateral decision as to the sexually explicit content of the
messages. Based on this decision, the service would be rele-
gated to the specific Dial-a-Porn prefix.' Second, at least on
Pacific Bell's proposed 900 network, there will not be the
167. Pacific Bell received authorization in March 1989 from the California Public
Utilities Commission to implement such a system. Telephone interview with Lisa
Zanville, Pacific Bell Director of Media Communications (Apr. 18, 1989). Pacific Bell
is still awaiting the federal district court's decision in Epsilon to determine if they
can constitutionally disconnect all Dial-a-Porn messages. Id. See also supra note 24
for a discussion of AT&T's 900 network.
168. Telephone interview, supra note 142. A 1988 amendment to the California
Public Utilities Code requires that phone companies make available to all providers
of sexually explicit recorded phone messages a separate, easily distinguishable tele-
phone prefix number for their messages. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2884 (West Supp.
1989). Giving effect to this law requires the implementation of a 900 area code net-
work. Telephone interview, supra. Under the new 900 system instituted by Pacific
Bell, all adult entertainment messages (live and recorded) will be required to be on
one specific prefix, and access will be available exclusively on a pre-subscription ba-
sis with the Dial-a-Porn service provider. Telephone interview, supra note 167.
169. Pacific Bell plans to block all sexually explicit messages on its 900 network
to residences which currently have 976 blocking in effect. Telephone interview,
supra note 142. If a residence or business is in an area that cannot receive blocking,
the 900 network service will be unavailable. Telephone interview, supra note 167.
170. Telephone interview, supra note 167. All Dial-a-Porn messages (live and re-
corded) will be on a 303 prefix; other recorded messages will be on an 844 prefix; and
chat lines will be on a 505 prefix. Id
171. Id.
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three minute limit or the two dollar maximum charge per call
that exists with 976 numbers on the current system.172 On Pa-
cific Bell's 900 network, there will be a twenty dollar maxi-
mum charge.173 Although this encourages message providers
to go on the 900 network, it also increases the potential for
minors who call from unblocked phones to charge up astro-
nomical unauthorized phone bills.1
74
Notwithstanding these problems, this type of network
should be considered as a way to provide easy access to sexu-
ally explicit messages by willing patrons, while constitution-
ally restricting access by children via selective blocking.
3. Beep-Tone Devices
Another possible alternative to restrict access of Dial-a-Porn
by minors is a beep-tone device.175 Dial-a-Porn message prov-
iders would insert a specified tone at the beginning of each of
its recorded messages. A device installed at the premises of
the customer who wished to restrict accessibility to these serv-
ices would recognize the tone if a Dial-a-Porn number was
called and would automatically terminate the connection. 76
This method of restricting access has garnered great support
as a feasible, effective, and inexpensive way to implement sec-
tion 223(b). 77 Although it places an economic burden on
phone customers who wish to restrict access, this device is
preferable to blocking because one beep-tone device installed
172. I&
173. I Pacific Bell will continue to earn a percentage, as yet undetermined, of
all Dial-a-Porn calls. Id Pacific Bell will not bill for any adult entertainment call to
the Dial-a-Porn specific prefix. Id.
174. Pacific Bell plans to have intermittent beeps sound during the message to
indicate the length of the call to the caller. Telephone interview, supra note 142.
They also plan to have a message at the beginning of each 900 number to inform the
caller that he will be charged per minute for the call and allowing the caller to hang
up without being charged. Id.
175. Third Report and Order, supra note 2, at paras. 23, 34 n.13. The device was
proposed to the FCC by John W. Olivo, Jr., a law student at New York University
with training in electrical engineering, through the NYU Media Law Clinic in re-
sponse to the FCC's Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Gen. Docket No. 83-989,
51 Fed. Reg. 26,915 (July 28, 1986). Carlin III, 837 F.2d 546, 554 (2d Cir. 1988).
176. Third Report and Order, supra note 2, at para. 23. The cost to the message
provider would be only the cost of a cassette tape to provide the specific beep. The
cost to the phone customer for the device to restrict access would be approximately
five to ten dollars. I&
177. I& Southwestern Bell, Bell Atlantic, and the NYNEX Telephone Companies
support the overall merit of the proposal.
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at one telephone would prevent access to all Dial-a-Porn num-
bers 78 without restricting access to other 976 numbers. 79
As a prototype does not yet exist for the beep-tone device,
its ultimate viability is in question. The Second Circuit in Car-
lin III suggested that such a device would "theoretically...
avoid the problems associated with scrambling and access
codes, at a relatively low cost for [message] providers and
phone customers, ' 80 but questioned its technical feasibility.
The court directed the FCC to reopen its proceedings to con-
sider the feasibility, costs and benefits of its use as an optional
defense under section 223(b) once it is manufactured in
prototype.'1
8
This device is especially favorable in terms of protecting the
first amendment rights of the Dial-a-Porn customer. Unlike
access codes and scrambling, it imposes no burden on the cus-
tomer who wishes to access these messages.
Conclusion
The governmental interest in protecting minors from expo-
sure to sexually explicit material has consistently been recog-
nized as compelling, thereby justifying limited interference
with first amendment protected speech. In regulating Dial-a-
Porn, this governmental interest in protecting children from
obscene and indecent recorded phone messages must be bal-
anced against the right of adults to communicate and receive
communication freely over the telephone.
Courts will undoubtedly continue to recognize the ever-in-
creasing concern for protecting the well-being of children as a
compelling governmental interest. The Dial-a-Porn industry,
now more than ever, requires regulation. The first amend-
178. This assumes that all Dial-a-Porn messages would be required to have initial
beep tones.
179. The device could also be placed at a terminal block for the premises and thus
prevent access to Dial-a-Porn messages at all phones within the premises. See Third
Report and Order, supra note 2, at para. 23.
180. 837 F.2d at 556. The court in Carlin II, referring to the access code system,
noted: "That plan may very effectively prevent minors from accessing dial-a-porn,
but we express our concern over the potential chilling effect of a written application
and identification procedure." 787 F.2d 846, 856 n.7 (2d Cir. 1986).
181. Carlin III, 837 F.2d at 556. The FCC expressed its concern that this device
would be ineffective for recorded message services where the caller is connected to a
message in progress, because minors could hear a portion of the message before the
beep at the beginning of the message sounded. See Third Report and Order, supra
note 2, at para. 34 n.13.
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ment will not, however, allow content-based censorship of pro-
tected speech, resulting in unconstitutional restriction of
access. Therefore, as long as indecent speech is protected by
the Constitution, the 1988 statute cannot be upheld. Rather
than an allowable, narrowly drawn restriction on protected
speech, it is an outright ban. Rather than justified by a com-
pelling governmental interest in protecting minors, it is an
overbroad prohibition of protected communications to all
persons.
If the Supreme Court upholds the 1988 statute, it can do so
only by relegating indecent communications to a category of
speech unprotected by the first amendment--on par with ob-
scenity. The ramifications of such a holding would be enor-
mous, not the least of which would be the serious chilling
effect on all speech. The 1988 statute could be applied to pro-
hibit such innocuous recorded messages as soap opera updates,
jokes, horoscopes, dating bulletin boards, and teen chat
lines.
8 2
The Dial-a-Porn industry can adequately be regulated by
much less drastic measures. Both Dial-a-Porn providers and
recipients should expect reasonable restrictions on this type of
speech, because it is so potentially harmful, and so easily ac-
cessible, to minors. Dial-a-Porn does not, however, require as
much regulation as broadcasting because, unlike broadcasting,
accessing a Dial-a-Porn message requires the caller, rather
than the provider of the message, to take affirmative action to
access the message. On the other hand, Dial-a-Porn requires
more regulation than cable television, as it is more difficult for
parents to control children's access.
In light of the ineffectiveness of the 1983 statute and the
accompanying FCC regulations, it is not surprising that phone
companies and public utility commissions have taken matters
into their own hands in attempting to regulate the industry.
However, allowing phone companies to refuse service to
message providers based on the amorphous classification of
"adult entertainment," as the Ninth Circuit has ruled, con-
dones censorship and should not be allowed.
Limiting the regulation of Dial-a-Porn to obscene messages
would severely diminish the potency of any attempt to restrict
access by minors, as most Dial-a-Porn messages, though
182. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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clearly indecent, may not so clearly be "obscene." However,
allowing phone companies across the country to refuse service
on the basis of message content also raises serious constitu-
tional questions. The FCC regulations under the 1983 statute
provide alternatives which would adequately restrict access by
minors, while allowing access by willing adults, without undue
burden to any party, if Dial-a-Porn message providers were
forced to comply or face strict penalties. These regulations
have been subject to strict scrutiny and have been upheld by
the Second Circuit as the least restrictive means available to
constitutionally regulate Dial-a-Porn.
The Second Circuit's decision in Carlin III, by upholding the
1983 statute only as it applied to obscene communications, did
not do enough to adequately restrict Dial-a-Porn. The 1988
statute goes much too far. A statute regulating both obscene
and indecent speech can be constitutionally enforced, but only
to serve the compelling governmental interest of protecting
minors. The statute should, therefore, be limited to communi-
cations to persons under eighteen years of age and should pro-
vide for a defense if access is restricted in accordance with the
current FCC regulations (or under any additional methods de-
termined by regular FCC investigations to be viable, including
the segregation of messages to a 900 area code network, where
they can be separately and selectively blocked). Strict en-
forcement of such a statute would force Dial-a-Porn providers
to restrict minors' access, while allowing continued access by
willing adult listeners and would provide the necessary consis-
tency in the industry that could lead to effective regulation of
both indecent and obscene messages without allowing censor-




The following are examples of the types of messages avail-
able on a Dial-a-Porn 976 number:
1) Two women, Stacy and Betty, on a camping trip:
Stacy: The trees are so big and hard, they only remind me of
one thing, and we didn't bring one.
Betty: Oh, a hard dick.
Stacy: Poor Betty. You're horny too?
Betty: Oh, wait-what's that? Someone's coming.
Stacy: Wait, that hat. It's the forest ranger.
Betty: Hey, Mr. Ranger, Mr. Ranger, we need help.
Stacy: Oh, could you help us, sir. We need to start a fire and
we need to know what you rub against a stick to make enough
friction.
Betty: Yeah, your stick.
Stacy: Come on, ranger, show us your biggest redwood.
Betty: Oh my God, look at the size of it. Oh, let me suck on it.
Umm-it's so big and it tastes so good.
Stacy: Oh, God. This is such a turn-on.
Betty: Let me pull your shorts downi Stacy, and give you a
taste.
Stacy: Oh, yes. Oh, Betty, that feels so good.
Betty: Come on ranger, rub your big stick between my tits.
Oh, yeah, oh your shaft is so long and hard. Come on over
here and put it in me while I eat up Stacy's sweet snoot.
Stacy: Oh, Betty. Oh, you lick me so good.
Betty: Come on ranger, put it in my hot little body.
Stacy: Betty, oh you have such a light little tongue. Oh, its
right on my clit. Oh, lick it.
Betty: Oh, you're so good, Stacy. Oh, pump me ranger. Do it
to me from behind.
Stacy: Oh my God. Oh, God. I'm gonna come. Oh, I'm gonna
come right on your tongue.
Dial-a-Porn message, choice number 3, (415) 976-6900 (Mar. 22,
1989). The message was one of six possible selections. After
the message concludes, a female voice asks the caller to call
her in person if he would like to talk to her and has a major
credit card, and she gives another phone number. Id.
2) A woman speaking directly to the listener:
Hi, baby. I'm glad you're here. You know, whenever I think
about you, I get real horny. My little snatch gets so creamy.
I'm so wet for you right now. See, I'm spreading my legs
wide, so that you can feel how much I want you. Oh, yeah.
19891
526 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 11:493
Oh, slide your hand down to my juicy hole and feel what
you've done to me. Rub my juice all over my clit. Oh, yeah.
Put your finger inside me. Oh, baby, you're so good for me
and I'm gonna do something nice for you. I'm unzipping your
trousers. I'm taking out your big bulging hard-on. Oh, baby,
you're so big. I want to take it all in my wet mouth. Oh, you
taste so good. Oh, it's getting bigger. Slam it in and out. I
have it in my throat. Oh, I want it, please. I want your giant
rod in my tight twat. Come on, let me sit on you. Oh, that's
it. Hold it in me. Oh, oh, it's going in. I'm going down on it.
Oh yeah, oh yeah. Thrust it in me-up there hard, hard. Oh
(deep sigh).
Dial-a-Porn message, choice number 1, (415) 976-6900 (Mar. 22,
1989). The message is similarly followed by a female voice re-
questing the listener to call her in person if he has a major
credit card. Id.
